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ABSTRACT
Wheeler, David C., M.A., December, 1976 Interpersonal Communication 
Individual Choice as a Functi Information Processing (117 pp.)
Director: Duane D. Pettersen
In an attempt to study the effects of various levels of Informa­
tion Processing on risky choice decisions, this study investigated 
the variated responses of four levels of Information Processing 
(high, medium high, medium low and low) in a ranking and choice 
paradigm. Subjects were placed into Information Processing (IP) 
quartiles according to their score on the Repertory Role Test 
(a low score placing an individual in the high IP quartile , a high 
score in the low IP quartile ). The subjects ranked two sets of 
options according to the perceived riskiness of the options for 
the subject. The subject selected one option from each of the 
sets which they would prefer i f  they were in the hypothetical 
situation stated in the options. The variance in the riskiness of 
the choices or in the rankings would not warrant rejection of the 
null hypotheses. The study found a trend suggesting differences 
between the combined riskiness of the choices made by the high and 
low Information Processing subjects and the combined riskiness 
of the choices made by the medium high and medium low Information 
Processing subjects. A similar trend was also found on the relevancy 
scales of the MORS and the CRRS instruments. The trends indicated 
that the high and low Information Processors made more cautious 
choices and rated the options as less relevant than did the medium 
high and medium low Information Processors.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
There is seldom a day passes without an individual having to 
make a choice of some kind. These choice situations are usually 
f i l le d  with a plethora of options. Through some process the human 
organism sorts through the options and reaches some decision. The 
interesting event to be observed is the fact that d ifferent in­
dividuals reach d ifferent final choices, even though they have 
apparently received the same information. This is apparently why 
we have po litica l parties, d ifferent religious organizations, 
different service clubs and other diverse means of attaining what,
on the surface, appear to be the identical p o lit ic a l, religious,
#
social or humanitarian goals.
From the above observation three assumptions seem to be relevant 
considering human decision making or choice resolution. These 
assumptions have been taken from David W. Kale (1975) and modified 
to conform with the language and intent of this study.
Assumption #1: Each individual builds for himself a 
cognitive representation of what the 
world is like  and this serves to 
organize and give meaning to his
1
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experiences and the value of those 
experiences in future choice resolutions.
This cognitive representation is a most accurate schema of 
an individual's psychological make-up. I t  is also probably the 
best predictor of how an individual w ill behave in a given set of 
circumstances. This schema is viewed by M ille r, Galanter and 
Pribram (1960) as. a mediator in the perception of the world.
Any correlation between stimulus and response 
must be mediated by an organized representation of 
the environment, a system of concepts and relations 
within which the organism is located, (p. 7)
In essence this schema is an internal rea lity  which the
individual has put together to assist him in coping and adapting
to the environment in which he is located.
Assumption #2: The input to a particular individual's
cognitive system is directly related 
to its  output in certain predictable 
and describable ways.
This assumption deals with the idea that i t  is possible to 
determine the behavior associated with certain input to a system 
by dealing with the strategies that a system w ill employ in the 
collection and management of input. More specifically , the 
strategies used by the system w ill be directly re lian t on the 
internal schema of the individual. Thus, the internal schema of
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the world not only affects the output strategies but the input 
strategies as well. This is what is put forth by Schroder, Driver 
and Streufert (1969) when they defined information processing as 
"the nature and interdependence of conceptual rules available for 
organizing dimensional values." More simply put, when a person 
is presented information, he categorizes that information according 
to his own internal set of rules or values and processes that in­
formation to f i t  with his schema of his world.
Assumption #3: The most important variable in
understanding human information process 
may be the schema or structural system 
within which that information is being 
processed.
This assumption centers on the notion of the input content 
as not being as important as the process i t  goes through in ter­
nally within the individual. A distinction must be made clear at 
this point. There are two ways of looking at input variables.
The f ir s t  is the content or the surface features of the input.
The second is the way in which the input is processed through the 
individual's schema of the environment. I t  is more simply the 
distinction between what is being processed and how i t  is processed.
These assumptions suggest the idea that each individual has 
certain strategies for reaching a decision in processing information.
Thus, one might surmise that variance within a research paradigm 
may be accounted for by differences in the structures or schemas 
used by individual subjects in the research environment.
Based on these assumptions, Kale provides a three stage 
model used by individuals in processing information. An individual 
f i r s t  pulls from his environment the information which is of 
relevance. This might be termed selective perception of the world. 
Secondly, the individual d ifferentiates the selected information 
into categories available from his schema of the world. I f  the 
information does not f i t  into a present category, he can either 
discard the input, develop a new category, or d istort the informa­
tion to f i t  a given category. The fina l stage of the process is the 
judgment of the value of the input. This stage includes the when, 
where, why, and how of the use of the processed information.
All three of the above stages are influenced or directed by 
the internal schema the individual has of his world. In addition 
to the three stages there is an environmental factor which can affect 
the processing of information. This factor is the complexity/ 
sim plicity of the environment. The effect of the environment can be 
due to the environment being so scarce in input elements that there 
is l i t t l e  or no relevant input for the individual. This could cause 
a withdrawal by the individual from the environment, i . e . ,  elderly 
people in the s te rile  environment of a rest home. The other extreme
of environmental input is that the environment is so complex that 
the individual's perceptive, differentiating and judgment capacities 
are overpowered rendering the individual unable to process the input. 
This could also cause a withdrawal from the environment until coping 
powers return, or create a complete avoidance of the specific en­
vironment, i . e . ,  an individual who has taken an hallucinogenic drug, 
or a student unable to progress in a given academic fie ld .
In the present study, consideration of how individuals process 
given input from the environment is specifically related to the 
phenomenon of risk and perceptions of risk in an experimental 
paradigm. In the present study Information Processing w ill be re- . 
lated to the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire paradigm of choice sh ift.
The nature of risk and perceptions of risk are subjective in nature, 
thus an investigation into the effects of various levels of informa­
tion processing upon risk decisions appears to be relevant.
The subjective nature of risk in the choice sh ift paradigm is 
supported by recent studies in the area using the standard Choice 
Dilemma Questionnaires (CDQ) paradigm (Vinokur, 1971; Burnstein, 
M ille r, Vinokur, Katz and Crowley, 1971). "Subjective expected 
u tility "  of the decision and its  outcome was found to be important 
in both of these studies. Burnstein et a l. states specifically  
the choice observed was epiphenomenal, i . e . ,  the choice sh ift was 
a direct result of a change or reprocessing of the subjective expected
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u t i l i ty  of the decision to be made within the CDQ item. The in­
dividual 's personal schema of the world had been re-ordered, thus 
the decision was changed and the choice sh ift occurred.
The next chapter consists of three sections. The f ir s t  section 
includes a review of the choice sh ift lite ra tu re . The second section 
narrows the scope of the study to individual effects on choice 
resolutions. The third section provides an explanation of informa­
tion processing and some of its  possible implications for choice 
resolutions.
CHAPTER I I  
REVIEWS OF LITERATURE
Review of Choice Shift Literature
The bulk of the choice sh ift research has been based on the
use of the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ) paradigm. The CDQ 
paradigm uses a series of hypothetical situations in which the 
central character is presented with a possibly risky choice. The 
subject is asked to choose the odds of success required before the 
subject would advise the central character to take the risky choice. 
The odds range from 1 chance out of ten of success (risky) to under 
no conditions should the central character take the risk (cautious), 
The odds scale consists of 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 chances out of 10 and no 
chance for success i f  the choice is made by the central character.
The CDQ was developed by Kogan and Wallach (1964) to investigate 
the phenomenon of individuals making a risk ier or more daring choice
when in a group than when making the choice on their own.
From this paradigm three hypotheses have evolved to explain the 
phenomenon of choice sh ift from the individual choice to a group con­
dition choice on the CDQ. The three hypotheses which seem to be 
gaining the most support in the lite ra tu re  are the diffusion of 
responsibility, the persuasive arguments and the cultural-values 
hypotheses.
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The diffusion of responsibility hypothesis was f ir s t  proposed 
by Wallach, Kogan and Bern (1964). The basis of this explanation 
is the idea that with shared responsibility a diffusion of the 
individual blame for negative consequences occurs. The decreasing 
amount of individual responsibility leads to reduction in the fear 
of fa ilu re , a reduction in anxiety level and an increase in the 
amount of risky action to which the individuals in the group are 
w illing to be committed. Although this hypothesis has gained support 
from a number of studies (Secord and Backman, 1964; Pruitt and 
Teger, 1967; Kogan and Wallach, 1967), there are some recent studies 
which put this hypothesis into doubt. These studies raise sig­
n ificant questions in four areas: The effect of group size on the
amount of choice s h ift, cautions shifts on certain items, effects on 
group cohesion on the amount of choice sh ift and the effects of 
leadership.
I f  the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis is an accurate 
explanation of choice sh ift group size should show a positive cor­
relation with the amount of risk for which a group w ill take 
responsibility. I f  increased anonymity is the reason that fear of 
fa ilu re  is reduced and the anxiety which accompanies that fear, 
then i t  should follow that the bigger the group, the more risk the 
group w ill take. P ru itt and Teger (1967) found just such a result. 
They found that there was a significant difference between a group
9
with three members and a group with four or five  members. However, 
in a more recent study (Myers and Arenson, 1972) which systematically 
controlled for group size, i t  was found that there was no significant 
difference in the amount of risk groups of two, three, five or 
seven members would take. I f  group size does not affect the amount 
of risk a group w ill undertake, then a prime assumption of the d if ­
fusion of responsibility hypothesis is in doubt. This is particularly  
significant when i t  is considered that both studies used the same 
CDQ items.
One explanation of the Myers and Arenson (1972) results could 
be that the groups were too a r t i f ic ia l ,  since the subjects were 
randomly assigned to a group size condition. I t  would then be sur­
mised that the individuals in the groups did not have the trust 
needed in the group to make the bigger groups risk ie r than the smaller 
groups. The problem with this explanation is the effect that co­
hesion has on group choice s h ift. Dion, M ille r, and Magnan (1971) 
found the more cohesion in the group, the less risky the s h ift. This 
was explained by the writers suggesting that affective bonds pre­
vented the individuals from wanting the others in the group to share 
in any negative consequences of the decision, or having the others in 
the group becoming the cause of the fa ilu re  in the perception of 
others or of se lf.
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The area of cautious shifts in group decisions does not seem 
to support the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis. Cartwright 
(1971), Blank (1968), Myers and Bishop (1971), and Moscovici and 
Zavalloni (1968) a ll found a consistently cautious sh ift on certain 
items on the CDQ. The diffusion of responsibility hypothesis does 
not allow or explain a s h ift in the cautious direction. The sh ift 
in these studies promotes the idea that cautious sh ift may be due to 
the same process in the group as risky s h ift. The basis for this 
notion is the fact that the same items across studies were found to 
have a consistently cautious s h ift, just as certain items con­
sistently evoked a risky s h ift. This finding further suggests that 
there may have been some unexpected subjective elements in the 
situations or the experimental condition which caused this consistency. 
There was quite possibly something the subjects consistently used 
on the various items which accounts for this consistency.
The second major problem with the diffusion of responsibility 
hypothesis is the effect of leadership on the group decision. 
Specifically, the leader persuades the individuals in the group to 
take a risk ier or more cautious position (Boulanger and Fischer,
1971). In their study, an emergent leader from a group's f ir s t  
discussion was asked prior to a second discussion to take a risky 
position, cautious position or neutral position. I t  was found that 
the leader could move the group decision in a given direction. The
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diffusion of responsibility hypothesis does not account for this 
because the decision is unilateral rather than m ultilateral in the 
group's acceptance of the consequences of the decision.
There are two studies in support of the. persuasion hypothesis 
(Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; Marquis, 1962). This hypothesis stated 
that i f  there were no predominant leader, there would be no s h ift. 
Hoyt and Stoner (1968) used management trainees and graduate 
students in business administration in an attempt to n u llify  the 
effect of leader riskiness and persuasion. They found that the group 
decision was significantly risk ie r than the mean of the individual 
decisions. According to the theory, these individuals would be con­
sistently more risky in the ir in it ia l  choices than would the average 
randomized group, thus less affected by a persuasive leader's risky 
arguments.
In the second study on the effect of leader influence in the 
group (Boulanger and Fischer, 1971), i t  was found that the leader 
did have a significant effect on the group's decision, although the 
effect was short-lived. The effect of the leader lasted only while 
the person was in that particular group. The cautious leaders and 
the neutral position'leaders both produced cautious shifts in the 
group decision. The cautious leader produced a s ignificantly greater 
cautious sh ift than did the neutral leader. The individual cautious 
position held through a post group individual decision. The risky 
•leader did produce a risky s h ift in the group decision, but the
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effect was transitory. When the member of the risky leader group 
responded in a post group individual decision, the members reverted 
to their in it ia l cautious responses. Thus, the leader's effect 
on long-term commitment to risk is in doubt.
Another problem with the persuasive leader hypothesis is that 
i t  assumes that the leader is the individual in the group who takes 
the risk iest stance. There is no consistent support for this 
assertion in the lite ra tu re . The hypothesis doesn't explain a 
choice sh ift on non-risk items (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969).
The persuasive leader hypothesis can account for choice sh ift in 
only one d ire c tio n ,- i.e ., in the risky direction. The unidirectional 
nature of this hypothesis leaves too many questions to be answered 
for this explanation to be a valid explanation of the choice sh ift 
phenomenon.
The hypothesis which seems to be gaining the most support from 
recent investigations is the cultural-values hypothesis. This hy­
pothesis has two underlying propositions. The f ir s t  is the values 
proposition which states that under certain conditions the value of 
risky behavior is greater and more salient than the value of cautious 
behavior. This would provide an explanation for both cautious and 
risky shifts in the situations on the CDQ. I t  would also provide 
an explanation for consistently risky and cautious shifts on certain 
items on the CDQ. The second underlying proposition of this hy­
pothesis is the relevant information proposition. This proposition
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states that the values brought out and made salinet through the 
group discussion influence the individual to reprocess the informa­
tion in ligh t of those values and relevant information of the 
choices and values involved.
Investigations of the f ir s t  proposition show that risky shifts  
on certain items and in certain conditions do occur cross-culturally 
between English (Bateson, 1966), Israeli (Rim, 1963), Canadian 
(Vidmar, 1970), French (Kogan and Doise, 1969), and German (Lamm and 
Kogan, 1970) subjects. These studies found cross-cultural risky 
sh ift. Carlson and Davis (1971) found that Uganda subjects did not 
produce evidence of a risky sh ift as did American subjects in similar 
task conditions. This was interpreted as support for the cultural 
values proposition.
The cultural values proposition has two interrelated problems.
The f ir s t  is the methodological weaknesses of this proposition. The 
researchers in this area (Brown, 1965; Levinger and Schneider, 1969; 
Stoner, 1968; Morgan and Aram, 1975) have not put together what values 
they need to measure and how these values should be measured. They 
have yet to show that the values that are involved in the influencing 
of group decisions are measurable as of now. The methodological 
problems are intertwined with the conceptual problems of this propo­
sition . This second problem is in the defining of the values involved
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in the decision and the possible explanation of why those particular 
values seem to become consistently salient in some item situations 
and not in others. The values proposition can explain consistent 
risk/cautious shifts on certain items, but has problems explaining, 
conceptually, inconsistent shifts on other items. There has been 
no conceptual explanation of why cultural values come into play in 
a r t if ic ia l  situations of questionable relevance for the subjects.
Could i t  be that the a r t i f ic ia l i ty  of the situation is the factor 
which causes the subjects to rely on cultural values, as opposed to 
using individual values which may or may not be divergent from the 
values of the subject's culture? The question Which needs to be 
considered is: How much of the decision is influenced by cultural
values, and how much is influenced by individual values which may 
agree or disagree with the culture's values? How much is the 
decision influenced by other factors, i . e . ,  chance, unrelated con­
siderations, psychological state, perceived u t i l i ty  of the decision, 
involvement in the item? These questions would have to be answered 
by investigating the individual perceptions and processing of the in­
formation in each of the questionnaire items.
The relevant information proposition extends the cultural-values 
hypothesis to include the exchange of information, and, more im­
portantly, the sensitizing of the individuals in the group to the 
saliency of certain values and information. This exchange and ordering
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of the saliency of certain elements influences the individual to 
reprocess the item in a d ifferent fashion. This reprocessing in 
turn leads to a potential re-ordering with a d ifferent perception of 
the world and the item involved. This new and d ifferent schema may 
influence the differences between individual and group decisions.
The subjective nature of risk is important in ligh t of two 
studies (Vinokur, 1971; Burnstein, Moller, Vinokur, Katz, and Crowley, 
1971) where the subjective expected u t i l i ty  of the decision was seen 
as playing an important role in the decision. The subjective ex­
pected u t i l i ty  is considered as the sum of a ll the associated rewards 
of a decision and a ll the probabilities of success in the particular 
decision, or the action i t  calls for to gain the associated rewards.
For example, i f  there are two alternatives to a certain situation 
for action and one of the alternatives has a sum of associated rewards 
of 8 and a probability of success of 3 out of 10, the subjective 
expected u t i l i ty  (SEU) of that alternative is 2.4 (8 x .3 = 2 .4 ).
The other alternative may have an associated rewards value of 12 and 
a probability of success of 2.5 out of 10, the SEU of this second 
alternative is 3 ( 12  x .25 = 3). The second alternative would be 
the more appealing of the two alternatives.
I t  must be remembered that the two elements of the SEU are very 
subjective in their nature. The associated rewards are the rewards 
for that individual. The rewards may include perceived honor, control,
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success, acceptance or other rewards which may or may not be ar­
ticulated or consciously formulated. In any case they influence a 
decision in conjunction with the individual's perceived probability 
of success in the decision of attaining the perceived associated 
rewards.
In ligh t of the concept of subjective expected u t i l i t y ,  the 
question arises as to whether subjects view the rewards and proba­
b ilit ie s  of success in a situation significantly d ifferent and 
process the available information d iffe re n tia lly . In tu itiv e ly , the 
answer would be yes. I t  is apparent that individual perceptions and 
the effect of those individual perceptions need to be investigated.
The next section of this paper w ill investigate the research and 
findings in the area of individual decision making and some of the 
factors influencing the ways persons make decisions.
Individual Choice Effects
Lerner (1965) investigated individual perceptions of a particular 
situation to take note of the variance of the individual explanations 
given for the situation. The situation involved two workers. One 
of the workers was rewarded with a sum of money through no e ffo rt or 
s k ill on his part. The subjects evaluated the rewarded worker as 
more capable than the unrewarded worker. This evaluation occurred in 
spite of the fact that the worker was rewarded fortuitously. In a
17
study by Lerner and Simons (1966), subjects witnessed a fellow subject 
receive presumably severe shocks for making minor errors in a learning 
task. The researchers found that the subjects rejected and de­
valued the apparently suffering victim to, in some way, make the 
negative consequences seem deserved by the individual. This was 
apparently an e ffo rt by the subjects to put things in a correct 
perspective, since they could do nothing to a llev ia te  their peer's 
suffering. The correct perspective is that of a "Just World".
That is to say that only bad things happen to bad people and good 
things always happen to good people. This hypothesis has received 
considerable support (Landy and Aronson, 1967; Lerner and Mathews, 
1967; Rubin and Peplau, 1973; Shaw and Sklonik, 1971; Simmons and 
P iliav in , 1972; Walster, 1966). As Lee (1971) put i t ,  " I f  our hero 
did not win (at poker) our estimate of him would decrease even though 
objectively we have to realize that getting four kings had nothing 
to do with any of his qualities." (p. 66)
With the Just World hypothesis in mind, le t  us examine the CDQ 
and see i f  this perception of the world could have a bearing on the 
responses by the subject. F irst i t  must be realized that individuals 
have negative and positive prejudices toward certain occupations and 
social or status positions. I f  the subjects consider a football 
player in a negative perspective, i t  is possible in the item on the 
CDQ which deals with the. decision a football player has to make to 
win or lose the game that the subject would make a risk ier than
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average choice. The choice stemmed not from the situation in the 
item, rather the subject's perception that i f  the main character 
fa iled i t  was a deserved payment for playing "Mr. Big". Thus the 
choice made had l i t t l e  to do with the situation, rather i t  was in­
fluenced by a prejudice of a certain role position.
The same reasoning could hold in the positive direction. In 
the item on the CDQ concerning a successful businessman who is con­
sidering running for Congress on a minority party ticke t, a subject 
may look at the item and evaluate i t  in the following manner: any
minority party is the "good guys", the good guys always win. Even 
i f  they don't win the election, they w ill have been heard, thus the 
businessman should run no matter i f  his chances of winning are only 
1 chance out of 10. This would be interpreted as a risky decision, 
although the level of risk had l i t t l e  to do with the decision. All 
of the twelve items on the CDQ could be processed or evaluated on 
c rite ria  other than the level of risk involved in the alternative.
That is to say that a personal prejudice of the subject could sig­
n ificantly  affect the reason for the decision and the decision its e lf .  
These two examples show the effect of SEU on the particular items of 
the CDQ being used. This subjective effect is beyond the control of 
the experimenter, although the experimenter using the CDQ assumes that 
the subjects are going to process the items in a rational way according 
to level of perceived risk.
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The variance in processing of the CDQ items has been tested 
using major fie ld  of study as a dependent variable. This study was 
based on the personality differences according to a major f ie ld  of 
study found by Lehman (1965) and Sternberg (1955). These studies 
found that science majors have d istinctively  different personality 
characteristics, attitudes and ways of dealing with problems when 
compared with liberal arts and business majors. Sims, Harley and 
Weiner (1974), using the above studies, had subjects of various 
majors f i l l  out a CDQ. All subjects showed a significant sh ift 
toward risk from individual decision to the group decision. D if­
ferences between in it ia l scores fa iled  to show significance; how­
ever, in the group condition there was a significant difference be­
tween liberal arts majors (M=4.95) and the science majors (M=5.76; 
Mann-Whitney 11=2.5, p .05). In other words, the science majors, as 
a group, were more conservative than were the liberal arts majors.
In addition to the possible subjective individual effects a l­
ready presented, there is some evidence to support the perceived 
locus of control as having some effect on the way in which a 
situation w ill be perceived by a subject (Cohen, 1964; Feather, 1969; 
Kelley, 1967; Streufert and Streufert, 1969; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, 
Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum, 1971; and Wortman, Costanzo, and W itt, 
1973). These studies a ll discussed the attribution of desirable 
outcomes of an event to an internal quality of the individuals in the
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situation, whereas, negative outcomes were attributed to an ex­
ternal factor. This might be seen as a variation of the Just World 
hypothesis. The "good guys" have the internal qualities considered 
important, thus they w ill always win. The "bad guys" are simply 
receiving the ir just reward for being bad guys. The difference is 
that the focus has switched from the situation or role to certain 
internal qualities of the individual described in the situation.
For example, in the item which deals with the electrical engineer 
who has been offered a position with a new company which is less 
secure and more promising than his present position, the subject 
may process the information with regard to the a b ility  of the engineer, 
although his a b ility  was not exp lic itly  stated in the item. The 
processing would work in this manner: the engineer must be par­
ticu la rly  competent and able as an engineer for him to have been 
offered the position with the^new company. I f  the company succeeds, 
he is in that much better a position; i f  the company fa ils ,  he should 
be able to market his sk ills  and get into a position no worse 
(maybe better) than the position he is presently occupying.
This internal quality factor is of particular importance in 
lig h t of a study by Jellison and Riskind (1971). In that study i t  
was found that the subject's perception of the central character's 
a b ility  correlated with their perception of the central character's 
risk taking. The researchers suggested that the risky sh ift or 
choice sh ift lite ra tu re  should be reinterpreted in terms of perceived 
a b ility  of the central character in the item.
The above perception of a b ility  factor relates to the notion 
of the central character exerting control over the situation. This 
notion of control has very l i t t l e  to do with the rational perception 
pf the individual's control over the situation (Strickland, Lewicki 
and Katz, 1966; Langer, 1975). This notion of control could be 
manifested in any of a number of ways. I t  could be perceived as a 
need for competence (White, 1959), an instinct to master (Hendripk, 
1943), a striving for superiority (Adler, 1930), or a striving for 
personal causation (deCharms, 1968). No matter how i t  is termed 
there is agreement that people are motivated to master their environ­
ment. This mastering may occur in any of a number of ways by a 
subject in evaluating or advising an individual in a situation.
This evaluation could involve the subjective u t i l i ty  of the 
decision which is to be made. That is the finding of two studies 
(Vinokur, 1971; Burnstein, M ille r, Vinokur, Katz, and Crowley, 1971) 
using the CDQ paradigm. In fa c t, in the la tte r  study (Burnstein 
et a l . ,  1971), i t  was stated that the subjects made their decision 
of choice on the CDQ according to the subjective expected u t i l i ty  
(SEU) of the decision. This study further suggested that changes 
in choice on the CDQ, i . e . ,  choice s h ift, were epiphenomenal in 
that they were a direct result of changes in the SEU of the decision 
for the subject.
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In lig h t of the subjective effects that may be introduced 
into the CDQ paradigm, i t  is apparent that research needs to be 
done of the SEU effects on the CDQ and the interpretation of findings. 
This should be done with a control for experimenter bias and with 
regard for the reasons and processes used by the individuals in the 
paradigm. This is the direction of the present study.
In an e ffo rt to define and thus lim it the scope of the investi­
gation, the present study w ill be limited to the specific effects 
of the information processing level of an individual on a choice 
selection paradigm. Information processing (IP) and its  effects 
w ill be discussed in the next section of this paper.
Information Processing
Although there are several ways information processing (IP) 
has been defined and conceptualized (Schroder, Driver, and Streufert, 
1969; Harvey, 1963, 1966), this study w ill center on B ieri's  (1955, 
1961) conceptualization and definition of IP or cognitive complexity/ 
simplicity with reference to relevant findings from other con­
ceptualizations.
There is a need at this point to define a number of terms that 
w ill be used in this section. Differentiation refers to the number 
of elementary dimensions (stable, unique orderings of stim uli) in­
dividuals use in their perceptions of the world. The uniqueness of
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the dimension relates to the notion that the dimension must not 
have a strong correlation with another dimension for i t  to have an 
effect on the individual's perception of the world. For example, 
i f  two of the dimensions on the Repertory Role Test (see Appendix A) 
derived the same responses, these dimensions would not be considered 
unique and separate, rather they would be noted as one dimension or 
as parts of a third dimension. More specifically , i f  a subject 
rated the individual roles the same on two dimensions (outgoing-shy 
and happy-sad) i t  would be interpreted that these two dimensions were 
re la tive ly  the same dimension for that particular individual. An 
individual who uses several unique dimensions w ill be a more cog­
n itive ly  complex or of a higher IP level than an individual who uses 
fewer unique dimensions.
Articulation or discrimination refers to the number of gradations 
used to place stimulus objects along a unique dimension. For ex­
ample, on the Repertory Test (see Appendix A), i f  an individual uses 
a dimension (outgoing-shy) uniquely and places the rankings of the 
roles on the 3 and 8 , the individual is using a bipolar discrimination 
on that dimension. This bipolar discrimination would denote a low 
level of IP. I f  the individual uses a ll ten of the intervals on a 
unique dimension, the individual is using a wide variation discrimini- 
nation on that dimension. Highly discriminated dimensions would 
denote a higher level of IP.
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Integration refers to the way in which several unique dimen­
sions are combined to derive the individual's perception of the 
world. I f  an individual relates a ll of the dimensions in his schema 
in a fixed or hierarchical pattern, the individual is of a low IP 
level. This integration has only the dimensions related directly  
to each other through a restricted pattern. As the integration-level 
increases more alternative ways of relating various dimensions to 
various stimuli are possible, thus a greater complexity in the in­
dividual's perceptual evaluation scales. A high IP individual would 
use a number of intermediate combinations and flex ib le  perspectives 
for organizing the several dimensions in a high IP individual.
High IP under a ll three of.the above determinations deals with 
the abstractness of the organizational schema or structure of the 
individual. The higher the level of IP the more abstract the ind iv i­
dual's schema for viewing his world and defining the elements within 
that world. In the other direction, the more concrete the individual's 
scheme of his world, the lower the IP level.
Bieri (1955, 1961) based his conceptualization of IP on Kelley's 
theory of personality constructs (1955) which focuses on the differen­
tia tion  and discrimination used by an individual. This theory assumes 
each individual has a system of dimensions which he uses in the per­
ception of his environment and that the characteristics describing 
the relations among these dimensions refer to a person's cognitive
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schema of the world, thus a dimensional perspective of the ind iv i­
dual's scheme of his world.
Information processing research opens the need to investigate 
how an individual makes certain choices in a given situation. This 
investigation could possibly explain why there is a difference in 
response in similar situations by different individuals even though 
they have apparently been given the same information from which to 
make their choices or why the same individual makes a different 
choice a fter the passage of time. We could take the stance of 
Greaves (1971), "to be purely colloquial about i t ,  d ifferent people 
actually think d ifferen tly , which, in turn, has a specific effect on 
the way they act." (p. 52) Although this statement has in tu itive  
v a lid ity , i t  does nothing to control for individual variance effects, 
or help explain how these differences affect the various paradigms 
used in research, or help explain the differences in various individual 
processes for reaching d ifferent decisions in the same choice 
situations.
I f  there are differences among individual's cognitive schema of 
the world, how might these affect the individual's response to various 
situations or paradigms? Specifically, for each of the various re­
search environments used we can only hypothesize the effect of IP 
level on the results achieved through a particular paradigm. These 
hypotheses would need to be based on the research which shows that 
different IP levels result in d ifferent outcomes on certain areas of 
investigation.
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Bieri (1955) found that high IP individuals more accurately 
perceived differences between themselves and others. Low IP in­
dividuals, on the o.ther hand, more often inaccurately perceived 
sim ilarities  between themselves and others. These differences were 
interpreted by Bieri as indicating that high IP individuals are 
more versatile in both the simple and complex realms of behavior.
These conclusions supported the notion that high IP individuals are 
better able to accurately predict the behavior of others thus are 
better able to regulate their own behavior to reach desired goals.
This predictability  and perceived control may increase the SEU and 
lessen the risk of particular decisions for high IP individuals.
Higher level IP individuals perceived greater potential for con­
f l i c t  in relationships (Tripodi and B ieri, 1966). High IP ind iv i­
duals are more tolerant of change and conflict in their environment 
“ because of their ve rs a tility  in the behavioral realms. Thus, i t  
could be reasonably suggested that higher level IP individuals could 
more effectively deal with uncertainty in their environment, such as 
the uncertainty of a risky decision, than a lower level IP individual.
Lower level IP individuals are restricted in their adaptive be­
havior because of their inaccurate perceptions of s im ilarities  between 
self and other (B ie ri, 1955) and the characteristic categorical 
(black-white) thinking behavior of low differentiating individuals 
(Schroder, Driver, and Streufert, 1969). This restriction in adaptive
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behavior hinders the lower level processor in his attempts to deal 
with uncertain situations and decision resolution where the outcome 
is uncertain.
One point which has been overlooked in research is the notion 
that the experimenter has a certain IP system which influences his 
perception of the world. The importance of this observation is that 
the experimenter's IP level affects the way in which he approaches 
the experiment and the subjects, either of which influence the 
results of the research. Through the instruments the experimenter may 
inadvertently introduce restrictions on dimensions to the paradigm 
which influence the ways in which the subjects respond, i . e . ,  on the 
CDQ, the subject may not relate one option, by i ts e lf ,  as being con­
sidered risky without a comparison of more than two options (status 
quo vs 1 a lternative). I t  could be that the experimenter's con­
ception of what the paradigm and its  interpretation are revealing 
about human performance is unrelated to what the subjects actually 
perceived as their goal in the paradigm. This could lead to a com­
parison being made of perceptual "apples and oranges", so to speak.
In an attempt to test the variance between subjects' perception 
and the experimenter's perception in a choice paradigm, i t  would be 
necessary to provide a number of options in such a way that there is 
not a feature which would inherently make one option risk ie r than any 
of the other options presented. This would allow the subects to respond
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using the ir unique dimensional schema of the world for the sorting 
of the options. This could be compared with the experimenter's 
ranking and selection of the same options.
In this study the riskiness of the options has been defined as . 
the uncertainty of the outcome and the amount of control which the 
individual could exercise over the outcome of the choice. That is 
not to say that these two factors are distinct entities which are 
mutually exclusive. I t  is realized in the context of what has been 
presented with regard to individual differences and the SEU concept 
that perception of uncertainty and control would have areas of mutual 
and undifferentiated effect. For the purposes of this study, per­
ceived uncertainty and control are combined under the dimension of 
risk/caution. I f  there is perceived to be greater uncertainty and 
less control, then the condition is defined as increasing the r is k i­
ness of the option. I f  there is perceived to be less uncertainty 
and more control, then the condition is defined as decreasing the 
riskiness of the option.
The next chapter presents the specific rationales and hypotheses 
for researching the effects of individual information processing 
levels upon the ranking and selection of various options.
CHAPTER I I I  
HYPOTHESES AND RATIONALE
The thesis developed to this point, is that individuals d iffe r  
in their perceptions of the world. These perceptions d iffe re n tia lly  
affect behaviors exhibited by individuals. The task of this section 
is to delineate the specific hypotheses and rationale concerning the 
specific effects of individual levels of information processing.
The measurement instruments used for this research were de­
veloped to provide college students with a relevant instrument for 
ranking and choosing items with regard to the risk/caution dimensions 
of the item. Subjects ranked nine options of equal risk/caution 
quality, i . e . ,  there is no feature of an option which makes i t  in ­
herently risk ie r or more cautious than the other eight options lis ted . 
The self-ranking of the options helps to control for experimenter 
bias and allows for a more meaningful measure of individual per­
ceptions of the risk in each item. I t  also provides a number of 
options rather than the binary condition of the CDQ options (see 
Methodology chapter for a further description).
: The four groups of information processing individuals 
(high, medium high, medium low and low) w ill rank 
choice options significantly different from each other.
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I f  higher level IP persons form a more elaborate and m ulti­
variate personal impression of their world (Nidorff and Crockett, 
1965; Rosenkrantz and Crockett, 1965), then i t  is reasonable to 
expect high IP individuals to rank the options in a multivariate 
way, i . e . ,  there w ill be less ranking of the options through the ex­
clusion or inclusion of a single common feature of the options. For 
example, i t  would not be expected that higher level IP persons would 
rank a ll of the options with a single feature in common in one of 
the individual sorting stacks (see Methodology). This would amount 
to high IP individuals using less "leveling" behavior in evaluating 
the options than lower IP persons (Lundy, 1956; Berkowitz, 1957; 
B ieri, 1955).
H2 : Under content analysis, reasons for choices and
rankings w ill be d ifferent between the four levels 
of information processing (high, medium high, 
medium low and low).
Given that higher level IP persons w ill glean more information 
from the options (Tripodi and B ieri, 1964), i t  is reasonable to 
assume that the reasons high IP individuals give w ill show more ex­
tension of information beyond that given in the options as listed  
on the instruments. High IP individuals would be expected to show 
a greater v e rs a tility  in their conceptualization of the options 
and their reasons for ranking the options in the manner they did
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(Tripodi and B ieri, 1966). This rationale in conjunction with 
the rationale for the f ir s t  hypothesis provides the support for 
this second hypothesis.
The third and fourth hypotheses consider the option choices 
made by the individuals on the two instruments. On the f ir s t  in ­
strument, the Midterm Option Ranking Sheet (MORS), the subjects w ill 
choose the option they would prefer for taking a midterm examination 
worth 50% of their final grade in an elective class. On the second 
instrument, the Class Registration Ranking Sheet (CRRS), the subjects 
w ill choose a class format to register for in their major f ie ld  of 
study.
H3 : On the Midterm Options Ranking Sheet, high information
' processing individuals w ill significantly more often choose 
options requiring individual performance, while lower level 
information processing individuals w ill choose the group 
of own choosing options significantly more often than 
the randomly selected group or individual performance 
options.
: On the Class Registration Ranking Sheet, high information
processing individuals w ill s ignificantly more often 
choose the independent study options, while the lower 
information processing individuals w ill significantly
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more often choose the lecture class options in 
the other option categories.
I f  high information processing individuals are more certain 
of the ir judgments than lower level information processing in­
dividuals (Tripodi and B ieri, 1966), i t  is reasonable to suggest 
that high information processing persons have a positive perception
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of their a b ility  to make judgments and choices. This, coupled with 
the findings of Jellison and Riskind (1971) that individuals choose 
alternative on the basis of the perceived a b ility  of the central 
character, would make i t  reasonable to assume that higher level in ­
formation processing individuals would choose individual as opposed 
to group options. Lower level information processing individuals, 
on the other hand, would be expected to choose options with the most 
consistency in the elements of evaluation of the ir performance in a 
class, i . e . ,  the objective test has only one c rite ria  for evaluation 
(righ t or wrong) and known professor gives experimental certainty 
to the c rite ria  of evaluation for the individual. The group of own 
choosing options and the known professor options would provide more 
certainty for the lower information processor because of his re­
stricted adaptability to changes in the environment and relationships.
In the third and fourth hypotheses there is no predicted 
direction for the choices to be made by the middle two groups 
(medium high and medium low) of the information processing d is tr i­
bution. I t  has not been determined at this point whether these two
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groups w ill produce a weaker effect in the predicted direction 
of choices of the two end groups (high and low) of the information 
processing distribution, or i f  the two middle groups (medium high 
and medium low) in the information processing distribution w ill 
produce an effect d ifferent from the two end groups (high and low) 
in strength and direction.
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY
Subjects
F ifty  subjects were drawn from an introductory course in 
interpersonal communication at the University of Montana during 
Spring quarter of 1976. The subject population was equally 
divided between males and females. The subjects were under­
graduate students between the ages of 18 and 22 years old.
Procedure
The procedure consisted of two contacts with the subjects.
The f ir s t  contact was to collect information processing data on 
individual subjects. This contact was done in conjunction with 
data collection by Dr. Pettersen. The same information processing 
data was used for this study as well as for Dr. Pettersen's re­
search. The second contact involved the collection of rankings and 
choice selections on the two instruments (Midterm Option Ranking 
Sheet, and the Class Registration Ranking Sheet) frpm the same 
subjects for which information processing data had been collected.
The f i r s t  contact consisted of the subjects f i l l in g  out a 
modified form of the Repertory Role Test (Rep Test). Dr. Pettersen 
collected this data.. The instructions for this stage of data
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collection are contained in Appendix E.
After the Rep Tests were completed and collected from the 
f ir s t  contact, they were given to a trained work-study student 
for scoring and recording of information processing levels.
For the second contact, i t  was decided to offer the subjects 
a 15 cent token redeemable at the campus student center cafeteria.
The reason for this token payment was to overcome some expressions 
of resistance to cooperating in further experimentation. This 
resistance was due to the number of other experiments in which in­
dividual class members had been asked to participate.
The second contact took place approximately one month a fter the 
f ir s t  contact. This contact consisted of administering two in­
struments to subjects for their ranking of the options and their 
choice selection. The task consisted of having the subjects read the 
options and sort them according to a set procedure as set forth in 
Appendix F.
Following the second contact, the rankings and choices were re­
corded and sorted on a master record with individual information 
processing levels for la te r data analysis. The reasons for the 
rankings and choices were content analyzed a fter being placed into 
four (high, medium high, medium low and low) quartiles of information 
processing according to the individual subject's IP score on the 
Rep Test.
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Operationalizations
The rankings of the options are used to determine the risk / 
cautions of the individual's choice according to his own perceptions. 
The options in the f ir s t  stacking (see Appendix F) are operationally 
defined as being risky options for that individual. The options in 
the second stacking are operationally defined as being the cautious 
options for that individual. The remaining options are defined 
operationally as that person's neutral options.
I f  an individual chooses an option from the f ir s t  stacking, that 
w ill be considered a risky choice. I f  the person chooses an option 
from the second stacking, that w ill be considered a cautious choice. 
I f  the person chooses an option from the remaining stack, that w ill 
be considered a neutral choice. All of these definitions are made 
regardless of the actual option involved.
A risky option is defined as one in which the subject perceives 
that there is uncertainty with regard to the positive outcome of the 
option and the amount of perceived control the individual could 
exercise to influence the outcome. On the f ir s t  instrument, the 
Midterm Option Ranking Sheet (MORS), the certainty variables are the 
type of test for a midterm examination (objective tes t, subjective 
test and class presentation). The perceived control variables on 
the MORS are the way in which the test is to be taken (individually, 
in a randomly selected group or a group of the subject's own 
choosing) (see Fig. 1).
37
Elements of Perceived Control
Randomized Own Individual
Group Group Performance
Class
Criteria Presentation Option B Option F Option G
for
Evaluation Subjective
Elements Test Option I Option A Option E
(certainty)
Objective
Test Option D Option H Option C
Fig. 1. Matrix for Options on the Midterm Option Ranking Sheet (MORS).
On the second instrument, the Class Registration Ranking Sheet 
(CRRS), the certainty variables are the amount of knowledge available 
about the professor of a class (known professor, unknown professor, 
and a s ta ff member). The control variables on the CRRS are the type 
of teaching method for the class (independent study, a lecture- 
discussion class and a lecture class) (see Fig. 2).
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Lecture Lecture- Independent
Class Discussion Study
Class
C riteria Presentation Option A Option D Option H
for
Evaluation Subjective
Elements Test Option I Option B Option F
(certainty)
Objective
Test Option E Option G Option C
Fig. 2. Matrix for Options on the Class Registration Ranking Sheet 
(CRRS)
The above variables were placed on a 3 x 3 matrix. This pro­
cedure generated nine options with regard to the two situations, 
i . e . ,  the taking of a midterm examination worth 50% of the quarter's 
grade and registering for an elective class in the subject's major 
fie ld  of study. This provided two instruments in which there were 
no options which were inherently risk ie r or more cautious than the 
other eight options on the particular instrument. The instruments 
and their instructions contained a ll pertinent information concerning 
the respective set of options which was related to a ll of the options 
in the particular set (see Appendices B and C).
The IP level of the individuals was determined by the subject's 
score on the modified Rep Test. The modifications concerned the 
range of the scale and the positive/negative nature of the scale.
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The range was increased from six (+3) to ten (1-10). The reason 
for this change was to allow for a broader range of responses and 
to allow for more discrimination and d ifferentiation on the in­
strument. The second modification was the placing of the scale on 
the positive side of zero. This modification was to prevent the 
inadvertent narrowing of the scale's range because an individual 
refused to rate one or more of the roles on the negative end of the 
scale, which would functionally reduce the range or discriminatory 
use of the scales. This restriction of the instrument would in­
fluence the discrimination score on the instrument (see Appendix A).
The scoring of the modified Rep Test was done using the scoring 
procedure employed by B ieri, Atkins, Brian, Leaman, M ille r, and 
Tripodi (1966).
Cognitive complexity is measured by comparing each 
rating in a row with the rating d irectly  below i t  
( i . e . ,  for the same person) in the other rows on the 
matrix. In comparing any two construct rows, a score 
of one is given for every exact agreement of ratings 
on any one person. This matching is carried out for 
a ll possible comparisons, and the scores for each 
comparison are added to give one total score. Since 
there are 45 possible row comparisons in a 10 x 10 
matrix, the highest possible score is 450. A score 
of 450 would indicate that the judge have the same 
rating on a ll bipolar constructs to a ll of the role 
types. This judge would be re la tive ly  simple be­
cause he is using his construct dimensions in an 
identical manner to construe a ll the individuals 
on the grid. On the other hand, a person with a 
score as low as 100 is presumed to be re la tive ly  
cognitively complex because he uses constructs 
differently  in discriminating among people (p. 190).
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On the modified Rep Test used in this study, i t  would be 
expected that the overall distribution of scores would be lower than 
the distribution of scores on an unmodified Rep Test. The reason 
for this is simply that the scale has been moved downward to have 
the scale begin at zero rather than 45. A score of 450 would s t i l l  
be considered as the score of a re la tive ly  low information processing 
person. A score of 65 would be considered that of a re la tive ly  high 
information processing person. Since to this author's knowledge there 
has been no standardized range of scores or division of scores into 
levels, i t  is d if f ic u lt  to make an accurate comparison of ranges be­
tween the modified and unmodified Rep Test.
Subjects were placed into IP levels by dividing the total IP 
distribution into quartiles. The f ir s t  quartile was considered the 
high IP group. The second quartile was considered the medium high 
IP group. The third quartile was considered the medium low IP group. 
The fourth quartile was considered the low IP group.
Data Analysis
There were three analyses for the data which were collected in 
the study. The same analysis w ill be used on responses made on the 
Midterm Option Ranking Sheet and the Class Registration Ranking Sheet 
unless otherwise indicated.
The f ir s t  hypothesis was analyzed by determining the correlation 
between the rankings and the IP level of the subjects making the
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response. A Kendall coefficient of concordance: W was used for this 
analysis. A W = 0 was expected on the rankings of each instrument.
A W equal to 0 would show that the individuals with d ifferent IP 
levels were using significantly d ifferent perceptions and c rite ria  
sets to rank the options.
The analysis of the second hypothesis involved a content analysis 
of the reasons given for the rankings and the choice selections with 
regard to the IP level of the individuals making the responses. 
Difference in the reasons were expected in line with the rationale 
for this hypothesis.
The analysis of the choices made on each of the instruments by 
the various levels of IP employed an Extension of the Median Test.
A high correlation was expected between IP level and the choices 
made as stated in the third and fourth hypotheses for two instruments, 
the MORS and the CRRS, respectively.
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS
The present chapter w ill report the results of the completed 
analyses. Results are reported for each hypothesis in succession.
The range of the information processing distribution was 
55-187 with a mean equal to 103.28 for the subjects responding to 
the Midterm Option Ranking Sheet (MORS) (N=50). The IP distribu­
tion for the subjects responding to the Class Registration Ranking 
Sheet (MORS) had a range of 55-187 with a mean equal to 102.80 
(N=49). The same group of subjects responded to both instruments, 
but one of the subject's responses on the CRRS had to be eliminated 
because i t  was incomplete.
Information Processing levels were divided into four quadrants 
and designated: high IP; medium high IP; medium low IP; and low IP. 
Scores obtained from the Rep Test yielded ranges for the four levels 
as follows: 55-83, 85-95, 100-117 and 118-187 for high, medium
high, medium low and low groups, respectively. The respective means 
were 70.31, 89.5, 108.5, and 139.92. I t  should be noted at this 
point that there appears to be a wide disparity in the ranges of 
the four IP groupings. This phenomena w ill be discussed la ter in 
the Discussion Chapter.
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Hypothesis one states that the four groups of IP individuals
w ill rank order the options on the instruments signficantly
different from each other. The hypothesis was s ta tis tic a lly  analyzed
by the Kendall coefficient of concordance: with an expected
W = 0, or no s ta tis tic a lly  significant correlation. A significant
correlation between the groups' rankings would indicate that the
groups were using the same c rite ria  in their ranking of the options.
2
On the MORS, W = .83 (X = 26.56, df=8, p<.001) suggesting a
significant correlation between the groups' rankings. On the CRRS,
/ 2W = .83 (X » 26.7, df=8, p<.001) again yielding a significant 
correlation between the four groups' rankings. These results did not 
support the f ir s t  hypothesis because they showed a significant 
correlation between the rankings of the various IP groups. The 
significant correlation indicated that the various groups used 
basically the same c rite ria  to rank the options on the two instruments.
The second hypothesis states that the reasons given for the 
rankings and choices w ill be significantly d ifferent from each of 
the four IP groups. This analysis consisted of a content analysis of 
the reasons given by the subject on the record sheets for each of the 
instruments.
^Statistical analyses are taken from Nonparametric Statistics  
for the Behavioral Sciences by Sidney Siegel (1956).
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On the MORS, the reasons for the various rankings did not 
vary greatly between the four levels of IP. The rankings were 
generally determined by the perceived effects of doing the work in 
a group of own choosing or individually. The reason centered 
around the perceived control which could be exerted in a group of 
own choosing and individual reward (grade) for individual e ffo rt  
(see Appendix G).
The reasons for the rankings on the CRRS generally dealt with 
the predictability  of the professor and what could be expected in 
the particular class (see Appendix H).
The reasons for the choices on the MORS did show some trends 
between the four groups. The high IP persons gave more reasons 
which dealt with the individual control that could be exercised.
Low IP persons dealt more with the security or pooling of knowledge 
for a better grade. The medium low persons dealt more with the ir  
perceived control in an option, while medium high IP individuals 
scattered the ir reasons equally over knowing the persons involved 
in the option, the amount of perceived control that they could 
exercise in the option and the particular type of test that would 
be involved (see Appendix I ) .
On the CRRS, the reasons for the choices were mainly influenced 
by what could be expected in the class. High IP persons referred 
to knowing the particular mode of the class or how the class would 
be taught as being the ir main factor for pred ictab ility . Medium 
high persons stated the reasons for the ir option choices had to do
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with knowing the professor in relation to the particular way in 
which the class would be conducted. The medium low individuals 
gave reason for their choices which related to knowing the professor 
in the option regardless of the way in which the class was to be 
conducted, and the amount of perceived control which could be ex­
ercised. Low IP individuals referred to th e ir "feeling less 
uncertain" in their choices than in the remaining options. In 
spite of the apparent variance in the reasons given for the choices, 
the vast majority of the option choices were in the Known Professor 
category of the options (see Appendix J).
Hypothesis three states that high IP individuals w ill more
often choose the individual performance options on the MORS, while 
low IP individuals w ill more'often choose the group of own choosing 
options (see Table 3). Seven of the thirteen high IP individuals 
chose the individual performance options, while five  high IP in-
divuduals chose the group of own choosing options and one chose the
randomly selected group options. Seven of the low IP persons chose 
the group of own choosing options, while four selected the individual 
performance options and one selected the randomly selected group 
options.
High IP individuals favored the class presentation options in 
the ir choices. Medium high IP individuals were the only other group 
which indicated a clear preference for a type of midterm test,
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Table 1. The D is tr ib u tio n  o f Choices o f the MORS Disregarding
The Type o f Test to be Given
Objective Subjective Class
IP Group Test Test Presentation Total
High 2 1 4 7
Individual Medium High 2 4 1 7
Performance Medium Low 3 3 1 7
Low 2 1 3 6
High 1 4 5
Own Medium High 3 2 5
Group Medium Low 2 1 3 6
Low 3 2 2 7
High 1 1
Randomi zed Medium High
Group Medium Low
Low 1 1
the subjective test. The medium low and low IP groups scattered their 
choices over the three types of midterm testing procedures (see table 4).
The fourth hypothesis states that thigh IP individuals w ill more 
often choose the independent study options on the CRRS, while low 
IP individuals w ill more often choose the lecture class options.
This was not found in the data. Only four of the high IP individuals 
chose the independent study options, while six chose the lecture- 
discussion options and two chose the lecture class options. None of 
the low IP individuals chose the lecture class options, while nine
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Table 2. The D is tr ib u tio n  o f Choices on the MORS Disregarding
the Way in  Which the Test is  to be Taken
IP Individual Own Randomized
Group Performance Group Group Total
High 2 2
Objective Medium High 2 2
Test Medium Low 3 2 5
Low 2 3 5
High 1 1 2
Subjective Medium High 4 3 7
Test Medium Low 3 1 4
Low 1 2 3
High 4 4 1 9
Class Medium High 1 2 3
Presentation Medium Low 1 3 4
Low 3 2 1 6
chose the independent study options and three chose the lecture- 
discussion class options (see Table 3).
The choices on the CRRS were limited mostly to the Known 
Professor options. Only two individuals (one high IP and onw low 
IP) in the total distribution chose the Unknown Professor options.
No individuals chose any of the Staff Member options. This extremely 
uneven distribution reduced the elements influencing the subjects' 
decisions from the nine on the 3 x 3  matrix used to generate the 
options to three elements, i . e . ,  independent study, lecture-dis- 
cussion class and lecture class (see Table 4).
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Table 3. The D is tr ib u tio n  o f Choices on the CRRS Disregarding
Knowledge o f the Professor
Known Unknown Staff
Professor Professor Member Total
High 4 4
Independent Medium High 4 4
Study Medium Low 3 1 4
Low 9 9
High 6 6
Lecture- Medium High 6 6
Discussion Medium Low 7 7
Low 2 1 3
High 2 2
Lecture Medium High 2 2
Class Medium Low 2 2
Low
An extension of the median test was used to test i f  there were
any differences in the amount of riskiness, according to the
subjects' own risk/caution scales, between the four IP groups. On
the MORS this test showed no significant difference in the riskiness
2of the choices made by the four IP groups (X = 2.09, df=3, p < .5 0 ). 
There was a trend indicated in the data. This trend showed the two 
middle groups, medium high IP and medium low IP, made more choices 
below the median than the two end groups, high IP and low IP (see 
table 5). Choices below the median are risk ier than those choices 
above the median.
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Table 4. The D is tr ib u tio n  o f Choices on the CRRS Disregarding
the Type o f Class to be Taken
IP Independent Lecture- Lecture
Group Study Discussion Class Total
High 4 6 2 12
Known Medium High 4 6 2 12
Professor Medium Low 3 7 2 12
Low 9 2 11
High
Unknown Medium High
Professor Medium Low 1 1
Low 1 1
High
Staff Medium High
Member Medium Low
Low
Table 5. The Extension of the Median Test Data for the MORS
Medium Medium 
High IP High IP Low IP Low IP Total
Above the
Median 6 4 4 7 21
Below the
Median 6 8 9 6 29
Total 12 12 13 13 50
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The extension o f the median te s t showed a s ig n if ic a n t d i f ­
ference (X^ = 10.63, df=3, p ^ .0 2 ) between the four IP groups w ith
regard to the riskiness of their choices on the CRRS. Analysis
showed there was a nonsignificant difference in the riskiness of 
the choices made by the high IP groups and the low IP group, also 
there was a nonsignificant difference between the riskiness of the 
choices made by the high IP group and the low IP group, also there 
was a nonsignificant difference between the riskiness of the choices 
made by the medium high IP group and the medium low IP group. A
significant difference was found between the high IP group and the
2medium high IP group (X = 6.18, d f= l, p^..02) and the high IP
2
group and the medium low IP group (X = 3.71, d f= l, p < .1 0 ). A
significant difference was found between the Tow IP group and the
2
medium low IP group (X = 3.71, d f= l, p^ .10) and between the low
2IP group and the medium high IP group (X - 6.18, d f= l, p < .0 2 ).
The difference between the two high IP groups, medium high IP and high 
IP, and the two low groups, medium low and low, was nonsignificant 
(see table 6).
An extension of the median test showed a significant d if-  
2ference (X = 9.00, d f= l, p< .0 1 ) between the riskiness of the 
choices of the two end, high and low, IP groups and the riskiness of 
the choices of the two middle, medium high and medium low, IP groups.
51
Table 6. The Extension of the Median Test Data for the CRRS
High IP
Medium Medium 
High IP Low IP Low IP Total
Above the 
Median 8 2 4 8 22
Below the
Median 4 10 9 4 27
Total 12 12 13 12 49
In other words, the two middle IP groups made risk ier choices,
according to their own scale, than did the two end groups. The
choices of the two end groups were more cautious than the choices
made by the two middle groups (see Table 7).
Table 7. The Extension of the Median Test Data 
Groups on the CRRS
for the Combined
High-
Low
Medium High- 
Medium Low Total
Above the 
Median 16 6 22
Below the
Median 8 19 27
Total 24 25 49
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this chapter is to f ir s t  discuss the results 
with regard to the test of the'hypotheses. The second goal w ill 
be to draw conclusions from the findings of the research. The 
chapter w ill conclude with a section on the implications of the 
present research and some possible direction for future research.
Test of Hypotheses
The f ir s t  hypothesis states:
The four groups of IP individuals (high, 
medium high, medium low and low) w ill 
rank the options of the instruments sig­
n ificantly  d ifferent from each other.
The Kendall coefficient of concordance: W was too large with
a probability level which would not allow the null hypothesis to be 
rejected. The analysis for this hypothesis showed that a ll four of 
the IP groups were using essentially the same c rite ria  to rank the 
options on the Midterm Option Ranking Sheet and the Class Regis­
tration Ranking Sheet, thus the null hypothesis was not rejected.
The second hypothesis states:
Under content analysis, reasons for the 
choices and rankings w ill be significantly  
different between the four levels of IP 
(high, medium high, medium low and low).
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The reasons given for the rankings broke into three basic 
categories. The three categories were (T) the other persons in­
volved in the options, (2) the mode of the class or test, and 
(3) the amount of perceived individual control which could be 
exercised over the outcome of the particular options. The pre­
dicted rejection of groups of options by low IP individuals was 
observed, but this means of ranking the options was used by a ll of 
the levels of IP with equal frequency. I t  was also expected that 
high IP individuals would show more extension of reasons beyond 
the information in the options, i . e . ,  include other related infor­
mation or information other than that exp lic it in the options in 
the ir reasons for the rankings. This addition of information was 
not observed in the reasons given by any of the four IP groups.
The reasons given for the choices did show some interesting  
trends. On the MORS, high IP individuals gave more reasons which 
related to the amount of personal control and individual reward for 
individual e ffo rt than to the other persons involved in the options 
or the particular way of taking the midterm examination. Low TP 
individuals gave more reasons which related to the effects of a 
number of people pooling the ir information and knowledge of a test 
with many reasons including the aspect of the amount of control that 
could be exercised in a group of the ir own choosing. These reasons 
were consistent with the trends indicated in the choices that were
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made by these two groups. The reasons given by the medium high 
and medium Tow IP groups were scattered over the three categories. 
There was no consensus in the reasons given for their choices*
The trends in the reasons for the choices were consistent with the 
trends in the choices made by each group.
The reasons for choices made on the CRRS indicated that high 
IP individuals were more concerned in the ir decisions with the 
particular mode of the class, while the low IP persons responded 
that they fe l t  less certain in their choices. Medium high in d iv i­
duals gave reasons for their choices which related more often to the 
particular professor. Medium Tow IP persons produced a scattered 
set of reasons over the three categories.
Hypothesis two was not supported, although there were some 
general trends in the reasons given for the various choices. There 
was no s ta tis tica l test for the minor differences that were observed 
because of the small number of subjects which were involved in the 
majors reasons.
The third hypothesis states:
High IP individuals w ill s ignificantly more 
often choose options requiring individual 
performance, while low IP individuals w ill 
choose the group of own choosing options 
significantly more often than the randomly 
selected group or individual performance options.
55
Although there was a trend of choices in the direction of 
the hypothesis, the null hypothesis for the MORS could not be 
rejected. As can be seen on Table 1, the options of individual 
performance and group of own choosing were overwhelmingly the choice 
of individuals in a ll four IP groups. This phenomenon did not
provide the predicted results according to the third hypothesis.
The third hypothesis was not supported by the results.
The fourth hypothesis states:
High IP individual w ill s ignificantly more
often choose the. independent study options, 
while low IP individuals w ill s ignificantly  
more often choose the lecture class options
than the other option categories.
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for the fourth 
hypothesis. The results showed that low IP persons more often 
chose the independent study options than did the high IP persons.
The high IP individuals chose the lecture-discussion options more 
often than either of the other options. The low IP individuals 
chose the independent study option over the lecture-discussion option 
by 9 to 2 with the other three IP groups choosing the lecture- 
duscussion option over the independent study option (high IP group,
6-4; medium high IP group, 6-4; medium low IP group, 7-3, respec­
tive ly ) .
Conclusions
This section w ill take the findings of the present research and
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apply them to the choice sh ift phenomenon and the proposed 
explanations for that phenomenon.
The f ir s t  explanation of the choice sh ift phenomenon was the 
diffusion of responsibility (Kogan and Wallach, 1964). This ex­
planation states that individuals in a group w ill make a risk ie r  
choice as a function of the decrease in the fear of individual 
fa ilu re . The more people who share in the risky decision or the 
course the more diffuse w ill be the blame for fa ilu re . As applied 
to this study, i t  should have been seen that a ll of the individuals 
in their choices would have chosen group options as the cautious 
option, even over individual performance on the MORS and the in­
dependent study options on the CRRS. This did not prove to be true. 
In fact the low IP group which should have been more oriented toward 
fam iliar group situations chose independent study options on the 
CRRS far more often than did any of the other IP groups. This would 
lead one to theorize that maybe the fam ilia rity  of the situation is 
more important in the group decision action than the real or imagined 
sharing of the responsibility for the decision.
This idea of the importance of the situation gains more credence 
in ligh t of the fact that the CRRS was reduced from nine options to 
three by a ll of the subjects, less two, choosing options which dealt 
with the known professor or the professor with whom they were 
fam iliar (see Table 3). The importance of the fam ilia rity  of the 
situation can also be seen in the responses to the MORS (see Table 1)
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where a ll of the responses, less two, were in the individual 
performance options or the group of own choosing. On both in­
struments where there was uncertainty of the other individuals who 
would be involved in the option (the randomized group options) or 
who would be evaluating the subject's performance (s ta ff member and 
unknown professor options), there were only two responses on each 
instrument. All of these findings indicate that the riskiness in a 
group decision making situation may be due, not to the diffusion of 
responsibility for the decision, rather, to the individuals being 
more fam iliar, thus, more at ease, than in the individual situation. 
The fact that there are, in essence, fam iliar people to interact 
with and receive feedback from, the individual may feel more adept 
at dealing with the situation or the choices being made. I t  must 
be understood that this is not saying that there is a diffusion of 
responsibility, i t  is that the individual has another person with 
which to interact, someone else to be used for whatever purposes, 
be i t  to blame, get feedback from, hurl obscure comments at or 
defend, to name only arfew of the purposes. The basic notion here 
is that the interaction its e lf  assists in the choice sh ift behavior. 
The direction of the s h ift would be dependent on a variety of aspects 
which should be investigated through further research using ind iv i­
dual perceptions of the phenomenological aspects of the situation.
With the theoretical basis laid in the above paragraphs, the 
other two explanations of choice sh ift come into play. The relevant
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information or arguments comes from the interaction which takes 
place and a ll of the subtle verbal and nonverbal cues which in­
fluence a ll oral communications. The cultural values explanation 
has as its  cornerstone the exchange of information which influences 
the saliency of certain shared pieces of cognitive, affective and 
moral factors. All of this involves the interaction of participants 
with a common purpose. Although the goals within the attainment of 
that purpose may be varied, the interaction is a prime factor.
For the relevant information explanation of choice sh ift to 
hold there would have been a need for a difference in the reasons 
given for the various choices, particularly with high IP individuals 
showing more extension of information in their reasons. Since high 
IP individuals glean more information from a situation (Tripodi and 
B ieri, 1964), i t  is reasonable to expect that i f  more information 
alone produced risky choices, then high IP individuals should have 
given more reasons which provided added information into the situa­
tions on the instruments. Since the high IP individuals added no 
information in their reasons for their choices than did the other 
three IP groups, i t  can be assumed that the addition of information 
would not have played a more important role than would the actual 
interaction necessary to gain that additional information.
In ligh t of the afore stated results with regard to the reasons 
given for the choices and the apparent importance of the fam ilia rity
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of the situation to the subject when making a risky decision, I 
believe there is need and intentative support for a fourth ex­
planation of the choice sh ift phenomenon. The fourth explanation 
would state that because the individual has someone to interact 
with in the particular situation which decreases the unfam iliarity  
of the situation. This could explain shifts in either the risky or 
cautious directions and be parsimonious With previous research re­
sults in the area of choice s h ift. A risky s h ift could be explained 
by saying that the situation was fam iliar to the individual because 
there was and would be a fam iliar interactant in the situation. A 
cautious sh ift could be explained either as the result of group co­
hesion or other cu lturally  determined values or role images.
The major contribution of this study to the choice s h ift re­
search deals with the effect of relevancy of the hypothetical 
situations used in the choice sh ift research. In lig h t of the 
findings in this research, one of the major points of criticism  of 
the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (Belovicz and Finch, 1971; Blascovich, 
Beach and Ginsburg, 1973; and Mackenzie, 1971) must be reconsidered. 
That criticism  has to do with the hypothetical nature of the items 
on the CDQ. The criticism  states that because the items are hy­
pothetical, the subjects are not reacting to them in a typically  
normal way, i . e . ,  the subjects w ill be more risky than normal. This 
criticism  makes the basic assumption that individuals tend toward
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cautiousness in their decision making. In this study there was a 
relevancy scale on which the subjects indicated how relevant they 
f e l t  the options were, in particular i f  they thought they would 
encounter the options during their college career. An extension of 
the median test on the relevancy scales on both the CRRS and the 
MORS indicated that the groups which made the risk ie r decisions 
(medium high IP and medium low IP groups) on both of the instruments 
also rated the options as being more relevant, although significance
was only seen on the MORS (see Tables 8 and 9). On the relevancy
2
scale on the MORS, the difference was nonsignificant (X = 4.99,
df=3, p ^ .2 0 ). The difference between the two middle groups (middle
high and medium low) and the two end groups (high and low) indicated
2a significant difference (X = 4.16, df-1 , p< .02) (see Table 8).
Table 8. The Extension of the Median Test Data for the Relevancy 
Scale on the MORS
Medium Medium
High High_________ Low_________ Low_____  Total
8 4 3 6 21
4 8 9 6 27
Total 12 12 12 12 48
Above the 
Medi an
Below the 
Median
61
On the CRRS, the same trend in the difference between the 
ends of the distribution and the middle groups was found, although 
i t  was not significant. The overall difference on the CRRS was 
nonsignificant (X = 1.25, df=3, p < .8 0 ). When the relevancy scores 
for the high and low IP groups were combined and contrasted to the 
combined relevancy scores of the medium high and medium low IP groups 
the difference came closer to an acceptable level of significance 
(X2 = 1.05, d f= l, p < .50) (see Table 9).
Table 9. The Extension of the Median Test Data for the Relevancy 
Scale on the CRRS
High
Medium
High
Medium
Low Low Total
Above the 
Median 5 3 3 4 15
Below the 
Median 7 9 10 8 34
Total 12 12 13 12 49
When the above relevancy data is coupled with the findings on 
the riskiness data (see Tables 5 and 6 ), i t  becomes apparent that 
those groups which saw the items to be more relevant also made
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risk ier decisons. This is to ta lly  contrary to the previously 
mentioned criticism  of hypothetical items. The hypothetical nature 
of the items on the CRRS and the MORS is quite easy to see in ligh t 
of the class schedules of the university. Midterm examinations had 
been held three weeks or more before the MORS was administered to 
the subjects, thus there would be no expectation that the subjects 
would think that i t  was a "real" situation in preparation for up­
coming examinations. The scheduling for classes had been completed 
for the regular school year and only the few going to summer school 
would be concerned in the near future with registering for classes, 
as on the CRRS. These events in the university's schedule are 
supplemented by the fact that the subjects were never told that the 
instruments' results would be used for any purpose other than the 
stated purpose of data collection for a thesis.
The f ir s t  conclusion of this study is that there is a trend in 
the responses as a function of information processing, but the d if ­
ference in riskiness of choices and relevancy is between the ends of 
the IP distribution and the middle of the IP distribution. These 
differences are a function of information processing as measured by 
the Repertory Role Test.
The second conclusion is that there needs to be a rethinking 
of the effects of relevancy on decision making. I f  increasing the 
relevancy promotes risk ier behavior, as in this study, the measure­
ment of relevancy needs to be reconsidered. This study provided
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some unexpected results with regard to the effects of relevancy 
on a sorting paradigm.
There are two possible factors that influenced the curvilinear 
results that were produced on the option choices. The f ir s t  is the 
fact that the procedure forced the subjects to d ifferentiate  the 
options more than they may have under normal conditions. The sub­
jects were asked to rank a ll of the options regardless of how per­
tinent the options were to the actual selection of an option. Under 
normal conditions, the subjects may have excluded groups of options 
and ranked only the remaining options which they fe lt  were pertinent 
in their perception of the situation. Or they may have made an 
"impulsive" selection without any type of ranking procedure.
The second factor was the fact that the IP instrument used may 
not have measured the fu ll range of IP. There is a criticism  of the 
Rep Test (Schroder, Driver and Streufert, 1969) that i t  does not 
measure the fu ll range of IP levels. I f  the range of the Rep Test 
is from 0 to 450, what are the consequences with regard to the present 
study since the IP distribution of subjects was in the lower third of 
the total possible IP range? Would this placement and distribution  
account for the curvilinear relationship that was found in the data? 
There is the possibility that the IP distribution in this study was 
too narrow to fu lly  measure the differences which influence choice 
decisions. There is also the possibility in sorting procedures, as
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used in this research, the subjects used d ifferen tia tion , discrimina­
tion and integration, not just the d ifferentiation feature IP. In 
this case another IP'measure which combines measures of d ifferen­
tia tio n , discrimination and integration on separate scales may provide 
more crucial data to the furthering of IP research and conceptualizing.
There are four possible explanations of why the curvilinear re­
sults were obtained in this study. The f ir s t  explanation has to do 
with the narrow and shrewd range-of the IP scores of the subjects 
used. The second explanation deals with the fact that the Rep Test 
measures only the differentiation of the individual, when there may 
have been more involved in certain segments or throughout the sorting 
and decision making process. The third explanation deals with the 
methodological considerations of measuring IP with a paper and pencil 
test and observing other behavior in the experimental paradigm. The 
final explanation introduces the effects of environmental complexity 
and its  influence on the behavior observed in the experimental paradigm.
The third and final conclusion from the present study's results is 
the need in future research in the area of information processing to 
report the responses of the total range of the IP distribution. At 
this point in the IP lite ra tu re  the vast majority of the studies using 
the Rep Test report only the difference in responses between the lower 
half of the IP distribution and the upper half of the IP distribution. 
The present study found no difference between the upper and lower halves
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o f the IP d is tr ib u t io n , ye t d iffe rence  was found between the q u a rt ile
responses w ith  regard to risk iness and relevancy.
Imp!ications
There are several questions which need to be investigated before 
IP as determined on the Repertory Role Test, or other IP instruments, 
can be considered a viable means of controlling or accounting for 
variance in the results from experiment to experiment. The f ir s t  
question would deal with the distribution of the IP scale. What would 
be considered a "normal" distribution for research purposes? What 
would be the effects in various paradigms of a distribution which is 
unbalanced in a particular direction?
The next question deals with the norms for the various levels of 
IP and where are the distinctive levels of IP located in the various 
distributions. What is a tru ly  high (above a normal score) IP score
or a tru ly  low (below a normal score) IP score? How many points need
to separate the levels of IP before the levels become unique? How 
many unique levels of IP are there on a particular instrument? Is i t  
possible that there are more than four unique levels of IP in a dis­
tribution? I f  so, what are the effects of each of these levels in 
various behavioral situations?
There is also a methodological question which needs to be researched. 
What are the effects on the va lid ity  and r e lia b ility  of the IP instru­
ments when the experimental behavior is not the same as the IP deter­
mining behavior? For example, i f  the IP levels is determined on a paper
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and pencil test and the behavior in the research paradigm in verbal 
behavior, i . e . ,  the number of verbal responses in a group discussion, 
is i t  conceptually reasonable or valid to say the measured level of 
IP influenced the behavior in the paradigm significantly? There may 
be a need for another means of measuring IP other than the presently 
used paper and pencil IP instruments.
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY
In investigating human responses to certain events, the sub­
jective nature of the individual's behavior has become more and more 
apparent. This is particularly true when one is investigating 
phenomenological features and factors, i . e . ,  decision making in 
particular environments.
With the above notion in mind, the present study investigated 
risky choices made by subjects. The unique feature of this investi­
gation was that of having the subjects rank two sets of nine options 
according to riskiness. The riskiness of the subject's choice decision 
was then determined by the subject's own individual scale of the per­
ceived riskiness of the choice. This procedure allowed for a more 
accurate and meaningful measurement of the risk/caution nature of the 
choice according, to the particular subject.
The results indicated several interesting ideas, although none of 
the four null hypotheses were rejected. The f ir s t  significant result 
was the fact that the rankings of the options by the four Information 
Processing (IP) groups showed no significant difference. In other words, 
the subjects did not vary in the choices because of a difference in 
the way that the options were ranked. The choice decision was re la ­
tive ly  unaffected by the way in which the options were ranked.
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fhe second idea which gained support was that d ifferent 
individuals can make d ifferent choices or participate in d ifferent 
behavior for essentially the same reasons. In the present investi­
gation, no difference was found in the reasons for the particular 
choice decisions.
The s ta tis tica l analysis of the riskiness of the choices made and 
the relevancy of the options on the two instruments did indicate 
variance as a function of IP but not in the hypothesized directions.
I t  was hypothesized that there would be a significant difference in 
the riskiness of the choices made by the high and low IP individuals 
with a linear relationship moving from the high IP individuals being 
risk iest to the low IP individuals being most cautious. The results 
showed that the two end groups (high IP and low IP) were more cautious 
in their choices than the two middle groups (medium high IP and medium 
low IP ). I t  was also found that the two middle groups (medium high 
IP and medium low IP) saw the options as being more relevant with 
regard to what could be expected in typical college situation. Thus 
the difference that was found showed that the high IP and low IP groups 
were more cautious in their decisions and they saw the options as being 
less relevant to the ir situation. The medium high and medium low IP 
groups made risk ie r choices on options which they saw as being more 
relevant to their situation.
The results provided three conclusions with regard to information 
processing as measured by the Rep Test, the effects of relevancy in a
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situation and the direction for future research. The f ir s t  
conclusion was that there are differences in human responses as a 
function o f IP, but the differences occurred in a curvilinear fashion 
with the high IP and low IP groups being more cautious and con­
sidering the options less relevant than did the medium high IP and 
medium low IP groups.
The second conclusion dealt with the need for a rethinking of the 
effects of relevancy on decision making. Theoretically, those subjects 
who saw the options of being more relevant (medium high and medium low 
IP groups) should have made more cautious decisions. The subjects 
who saw the options as being less relevant (high and low IP groups) 
should have made risk ier choices. The results did not show th is . In 
fact, the results showed the reverse of the theoretical effects of 
relevancy.
The third conclusion presented the need for future research in the 
area of information processing to report the effects of IP over more 
than the differences between high and low IP groups. There was no d if ­
ference found between the high 50 percent and low 50 percent of the 
IP distribution in this study.
This paper closed with several research questions for future in ­
vestigation. These questions centered on the need for norms for the 
IP instruments before they can be used to effectively  control for 
variation from one experimental group to another, and the effects of 
the vaious levels of IP in various paradigms. The second center for
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future research questions was the methodological considerations of 
testing for IP through one behavior and having the behavior in the 
experimental paradigm be d ifferent. In particular, what are the 
effects of measuring IP on a pencil and paper test and observing 
another behavior in the paradigm, i . e . ,  a paper and pencil test with 
verbal ac tiv ity  being observed in the paradigm.
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APPENDIX A
REPERTORY ROLE TEST AND 
INSTRUCTIONS
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REMEMBER ::; PLEASE FILL-IN ALL THE 
SQUARES WITH- A.' NUMBER FROM THE 
SCALES BELOW.. THANK YOUL-
« °
10
Outging
Honest
Strong
Irresponsible
Interested in others — Slelf-Interested
Happy
Independent Dependent
Sensitive Insensitive
Boring SInteresting'
Complex:- Simple
I
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Instructions for Role Evaluation
The following evaluation exercise asks on to evaluate individuals 
who play fam iliar roles. Behind each role (in the space provided) 
place the in it ia ls  of a person you know who f its  the described role. 
Write the in it ia ls  of a d ifferent person for each role.
On another side of the 10 x 10 matrix on the next page is a l is t  of 
ten scales. Each scale consists of a pair of adjectives with 
opposite meanings. You are asked to place one of the ten numbers 
which best describes the person in that role on the scale.
For example:
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Good Bad
10 would be super good; 9 would be quite good; 8 would be good;
7 would be somewhat good; 6 would be not good; 5 would be not bad;
4 would be somewhat bad; 3 would be bad; 2 would be quite bad; and
1 would be super bad.
Rate a ll of the individuals presented on one scale before rating the 
roles on the next scale. All of the roles should be rated on the 
outgoing/shy scale before any are rated on the honest/dishonest scale. 
Please place a rating in each square of the matrix.
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Any questions? I f  not, please place your name on the next page 
where indicated and begin f i l l in g  out the matrix. Thank you for 
your cooperation.
APPENDIX B
MIDTERM OPTION RANKING SHEET
AND INSTRUCTIONS
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Midterm Option Ranking Sheet
Option A - For. the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups 
of 3-4 members of your own choosing to work through a 
subjective test as a group. The grade earned by the 
group w ill be the grade for the individuals.
Option B - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups 
of 3-4 members by random selection to give a class 
presentation. The grade earned by the group w ill be 
the grade for the individuals.
Option C - For the midterm, each individual w ill take an objective 
test.
Option D - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups 
of 3-4 members by random selection to work through an 
objective test. The grade earned by the group w ill be 
the grade for the individuals.
Option E - For the midterm, each individual w ill take a subjective 
test.
Option F - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups 
of 3-4 members of your own choosing to give a class 
presentation. The grade earned by the group w ill be 
the grade for the individuals.
Option G - For the midterm, each individual w ill make a class 
presentation.
Option H - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups 
of 3-4 members of your own choosing to work through an 
objective test. The grade earned by the group w ill be 
the grade for the individual.
Option I - For the midterm, the class w ill be divided into groups 
of 3-4 members by random selection to work through a 
subjective test. The grade earned by the group w ill be 
the grade for the individuals.
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Midterm Option Ranking Sheet Instructions
In addition to the information contained in the options, you 
are to consider the options as i f  they were options for taking a 
midterm in a class in your major fie ld  of study. The midterm is to 
be worth 50% of your final grade in the class.
The options a ll have a maximum time lim it of one class period
(50 minutes). The tests w ill a ll be closed book with notes being 
allowed for the class presentations. All of the tests and presen­
tations w ill be scored or graded by the instructor who is teaching the 
course. This instructor w ill also write the tests.
Make sure you have read a ll of the options and understand what
they require. You w ill be asked to rank order the options by how
certain you feel that you would do well i f  you were to take the 
suggested midterm using one of the options you have in the envelope. 
Listen to the directions and i f  you have a question or something is 
unclear, ask the researcher.
Don't be concerned with ranking these options in a particularly  
right or correct order. There is no right or correct order. I am 
only interested in how you perceive the options. Be sure to f i l l  
the record sheet out completely.
APPENDIX C
CLASS REGISTRATION RANKING SHEET
AND INSTRUCTIONS
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Class Registration Options
Option A - You may register for a class which is primarily lecture 
being taught by a s ta ff member.
Option B - You may register for a class which is primarily lecture- 
discussion being taught by a professor who is unknown 
to you.
Option C - You may register for a class which is primarily in­
dependent study being taught by a professor who is 
known to you.
Option D - You may register for a class which is primarily lectiire- 
discussion being taught by a s ta ff member.
Option E - You may register for a class which is primarily lecture 
being taught by a professor who is known to you.
Option F - You may register for a class which is primarily
independent study being taught by a professor who is 
unknown to you.
Option G - You may register for a class which is primarily lecture- 
discussion being taught by a professor who is known to 
you.
Option H - You may register for a class which is primarily 
independent study being taught by a s ta ff member.
Option I - You may register for a class which is primarily lecture 
being taught by a professor who is unknown to you.
87
Class Registration Ranking Sheet Instructions
In addition to the information contained on the options you 
are to consider the options as i f  you are trying to decide on a class 
for which you are registering. The classes are elective in your 
major fie ld  of study. All of the classes listed in the quarter 
bulletin would be of value to you. You notice that for some of the 
classes you know the professor teaching the class, for other classes 
you don't know the professor and s t i l l  others are listed as being 
taught by "staff". You do know that a ll of the professors in the 
department have been on campus for at least two years. You also 
notice that some of the classes are listed as independent study courses, 
some are listed as lecture courses and others are listed as lecture- 
discussion courses.
You must decide which classes would be most uncertain for you in 
terms of how well you would do. Be sure to read a ll of the options 
and understand what they require. Listen to the directions and i f  
you have any questions or something is unclear, ask the researcher to 
c la rify  the item.
Don't be concerned with ranking these options in a right or 
correct order. There is no right or correct order. I am only in­
terested in how you perceive the options. Be sure to f i l l  the record 
sheet out completely.
APPENDIX D
RECORD SHEET FOR 
RANKING AND CHOICE DECISIONS
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Record sheet for ranking and choice decisions
Name
RISK: Please write two or three sentences explaining why you
consider these options to be risky (uncertain) for you.
1.
2 .
3.
NEUTRAL: Please write two or three sentences explaining why you
consider these options to be neither risky or cautious 
for you.
1.
2 .
3.
CAUTIOUS: Please write two or three sentences explaining why you
consider these options to be cautious (certain) for you.
1.
2 .
3.
Please give an indication on the scale below as to how relevant these 
options were in your perception of the options available in the given 
situation.
relevant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 irrelevant 
circle one
Do you have some other options which would have been more relevant?
I f  so, write them on the back of this record sheet.
The option I would prefer under the conditions stated on the 
instruction sheet is option ___.
Please write two or three sentences explaining why you would prefer 
this option i f  you were in the situation described.
APPENDIX E
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO
THE SUBJECT TAKING THE REP TEST
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Ins truc tions  given to  the subject taking the Rep Test.
I am Duane Pettersen -  Course Administrator for the 110 sections. 
I o rig inally  developed the course in 1968. For two years, I offered 
one section per year. With limited s ta ff members, we can only offer 
eight sections a year and one section during the summer.
Every two or three years, I have tried  to evaluate the 110 
course. What are students learning? Does what they learn have any 
effect on out-of-class relationships? Are there any long-range 
effects? Does what one learns in this class have any effect on other 
areas of learning and other apsects of individual and personal 
development?
This quarter, three other s ta ff members are teaching 110 and I 
am taking a vacation. Thus, I f e l t  this would be a good quarter for 
experimental and controlled course evaluation.
I am asking you as students in INCO 110 to help me and the 110 
s ta ff in our continued development and improvement of the 110 course.
I am asking you to participate by doing three things:
1 - Complete one form for me now during class. I t  w ill take
about a half hour.
2 - I w ill be giving you a take-home questionnaire to be completed
and returned on Wednesday of this week.
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3 - Complete some forms for me near the end of this quarter.
All three 110 sections are participating in this most recent 
110 evaluation. In addition, there is a control group of students 
not involved in 110 this quarter not having ever had 110 in the past.
On these course evaluation forms I w ill be asking for your name. 
That is only done in order to be able to correlate the data on a ll 
forms. Once the information is taken o ff  your form and put on computer 
cards, the original forms with your names w ill be destroyed.
Also your instructor (Barb, Leslie or John) w ill not see your 
forms. The results of the course evaluation w ill  be made available 
to you i f  you so desire. More details w ill be provided at the end of 
the quarter.
Are there any questions about what I'm doing or why?
(Rep Test was given to the students.)
In this form I am looking at relationships which you have with 
specific individuals.
93
(The directions on the Rep Test were read to the subjects. The 
subjects were instructed to begin f i l l in g  out the Rep Test. After 
the Rep Test had been completed, the subjects were given a Personal 
Orientation Inventory to take home as part of Dr. Pettersen's research.)
In the take-home course evaluation forms, I am looking at a set 
of specific evaluations of yourself and others. This form looks at 
your assumptions about yourself and others.
Remember: there are no right or wrong answers on either of
these course evaluation forms. Also, the information you put on 
these forms is confidential and your instructor w ill not have access 
to the information.
APPENDIX F
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN
TO SUBJECTS SORTING OPTIONS
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Instructions given to subjects so rting  options.
I am David Wheeler. I am a graduate student in INCO. For my
thesis, I am investigating the different ways people handle the
same information, particularly when they are going to make a risky 
choice or decision.
I am going to need a half hour of your time to rank some options 
and make a choice selection for me. I know you have been h it  a 
number of times to help in research. I know you are tired of re­
searchers coming into your class and having you f i l l  out forms. I
need your help and to show my appreciation for your help I have
arranged to give those who help me a chit worth 15 cents over at the 
UC. I know i t  is not much. I t  is to show you that I would appreciate 
your help.
I w ill be asking you to rank order nine options and give your 
reasons for the way you ranked them. Then I am going to ask you to 
make a choice of one of the options and give your reasons for your 
choice. I am interested only in how you rank the options and your 
reasons. There is no right or wrong way to rank the options.
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Are there any questions as to what I need you to do? Is 
there anyone who does not want to take part in this study?
(The envelopes containing the f ir s t  set of options, instructions and 
record sheet were distributed to the subjects who volunteered.)
In the envelope you w ill find nine options, a record sheet and 
an instruction sheet. I want you to take a few minutes and read 
the instruction sheet and a ll nine options.
Now that you have read the instructions and the options, I 
would like  you to select the three options which you feel are the 
most uncertain as to outcome i f  you were to take a midterm (class) 
using those options. These are your risky options. Place these 
options on the le f t  side of your desk.
Next select the three options which you feel would provide the 
most certainty with regard to outcome i f  you were to take a midterm 
(class) using these options. These are your cautious options. Place 
these on the right side of your desk.
The remaining stack of three options are your neutral options. 
Leave them in the center of your desk.
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Take the stack on the le f t  side of your desk (the risky options) 
and sort these options according to their riskiness. The riskiest 
option of the three w ill be number one and the least risky option 
w ill be number 3. Record this sorting on the record sheet under the 
risk category and write your reasons for these options being risky 
for you.
Next, sort the stack on the center of your desk (the neutral 
options) according to their riskiness. The riskiest of the three 
options w ill be number 1 and the least risky w ill be number 3. Record 
this sorting on the record sheet under the neutral category and write 
your reasons for these options being neutral for you.
Finally , sort the stack on the right side of your desk (the 
cautious options) according to th e ir riskiness. The risk iest of the 
three options w ill be number 1 and the least risky option w ill be 
number 3. Record this sorting on the record sheet under the cautious 
category and write your reasons for these options being cautious for 
you.
Now that you have rank ordered the options, I would like  you to 
select one of the options and give your reasons for selecting that 
option. Also complete a ll of the record sheet.
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When you have completed the record sheet, place the options, 
instructions and signed record sheet in the envelope and hand i t  in 
to me and pick up the second set of options and sort them the same 
way you sorted this set of options. Remember to read the in­
structions, and a ll of the options f i r s t ,  then sort the options and 
f i l l  out the record sheet. Please remember to sign both answer sheets.
When you have completed the second set of options, hand in the 
options, instruction sheet and record sheet in the envelope and I 
w ill give you the chit for 15 cents.
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
APPENDIX G
REASONS FOR THE RANKING 
OF OPTIONS ON THE MORS
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The general content analysis categories w ill be shown followed 
by a numerical count on the reasons which were considered in that 
category. These categories w ill be followed by general examples of 
the reasons taken from the subjects' records for the MORS.
RISKY REASONS 
High IP -
Don't or can't trust others 13
Rejection of group of options 9
Need for individual reward for individual
Example statements:
"I don't want to risk a bad grade on people I 
don't know."
"You don't know how well you can trust others." 
"The main reason I rated these risky is the 
words 'random selection.'"
" I f  I chose a group they would be my friends and 
we get side tracked."
"(groups are) unfair to certain students because 
some w ill end up doing most of the work."
Example statements:
"You don't know how the others think or act, 
a random group would be chaos."
"You could have someone who wouldn't contribute 
anything."
"These a ll would be risky because of the group 
work."
"Teacher can grade a subjective test according 
to personal opinions and feelings."
e ffo rt 6
Medium High IP -
Don't or can't depend on others 
Rejection of group of options
14
14
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Medium Low IP -
Don't want to depend or trust others 
Reject a group of options 
Dislike a group of options
12
11
5
Example statements:
"Groups often contain an apathetic member."
"Don't want to work on grade and have someone 
ride along."
"I hate to give group presentations, especially 
by myself."
"I don't like  subjective tests."
"I don't feel objective tests are a learning 
experience."
"The group potential may be lower than your own 
individual one."
Example statements:
"Must depend on people involved in test, the 
chance of a bad partner."
"In random group, one person, me, might end up 
doing a ll of the work."
"I have had l i t t l e  experience with the test."
"You can get stuck with people that won't work, 
you wind up doing everything, yet everyone gets the 
grade.
Low IP -
Don't want to depend on others 
Rejection of a group of options 
L it t le  experience with type of test.
14
13
4
NEUTRAL REASONS
High IP
Don't know i f  can trust others 
Others might be able to help 
A l i t t l e  more control 
Generally the same as "Risky" options
15
13
9
4
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Example statements:
"The randomly picked ones s lu ff (sic) o ff or 
didn 't do their share, sometimes."
"These items a ll have the uncertainty of group 
work."
" I'd  be working with people and i t  wouldn't be too 
hard."
"These options I feel the same as above (risky )."
Medium High IP -
Might get more out of the option 14
The way of taking the test makes i t  better. 11
The type of group (own choosing) better. 6
Example statements:
"I consider these neither safe or risky because 
they are the kinds of situations which could go one 
way or the other, but the experience would be neat."
"We might get more knowledge out of the group." 
"Subjective test would make a l i t t l e  better."
" I t  can go good or bad depending on the rest of 
the group."
"These are neutral because I consider a subjective 
test neutral."
Medium Low IP -
More people to pool knowledge. 16
All are the same, in this set. 12
Cautious of others. 5
Example statements:
"Because a pool of people can group their knowledge." 
"You could possibly pick on the same level as you 
are."
"Though I am confident in my a b ilit ie s  and am 
cautious of others."
"2 heads are better than 1 ."
"They a ll seem to have advantages and disadvantages." 
"Get ideas brought in that you just didn't think 
about."
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Low IP -
The options don't bother subject.
The possibility of a l i t t l e  more control.
The options are rejected.
Example statements:
"Subjective test doesn't bug me."
"These don't make much difference."
" It 's  a cop-out."
" I f  I can choose the people.. .maybe I can get them 
interested enough to help."
"There is at least some control."
"Certain people don't have to function."
CAUTIOUS REASONS 
High IP -
Individual reward for individual work.
Control.
Rejection of a group of options.
Example statements:
"People get a grade for the ir work."
"I like  working by myself. I have total control." 
"You get exactly what you earn."
"In a ll these you are forced to learn the material 
yourself."
"I'm putting into the test, no one else is ."
"None of these involve the element of random 
selection."
Medium High IP -
Individual reward for individual e ffo rt.
Control.
Rejection of a group of options.
Example statements:
"I would do i t  myself except when i t  comes to 
objective tests."
"You got out the work and get a better grade."
"We'd be able to combine our knowledge with direction 
"Any group you pick wouldn't be too bad because 
you could control i t . "
" I t  is a ll up to you to perform or not."
15
10
6
17
13
9
16
12
5
I f
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Medium Low IP -
Individual reward for individual e ffo rt. 1
Rejection of a group of options.
Control.
Example statements:
"You can le t  the instructors know what you know."
"I have confidence in my a b ility ."
"This way you get the grade your deserve."
"I hate presentations."
"I know I can control a group i f  I choose the 
people."
Low IP
Individual reward for individual e ffo rt. 16
Pooling for knowledge. 12
Control. 12
Example statements:
"I have confidence in myself as far as taking a 
test in my major fie ld ."
"The grade is up to me - reflecting what I know 
about the material."
" I f  I am not certain of one thing, the others in the 
group can straighten me out."
"I would choose who I work with thus I control the 
direction of the group."
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APPENDIX H
REASONS FOR THE RANKING 
OF OPTIONS ON THE CRRS
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The general content analysis categories w ill be shown followed 
by a numerical count on the reasons which were considered in that 
category. These categories w ill be followed by general examples 
of the reasons taken from the subjects' records for the CRRS.
RISKY REASONS 
High IP -
Must know the professor. 19
Can't know what to expect. 6
Problems with "Staff" options. 6
Rejection of a group of options. 6
Example statements:
" I f  I don't know the professor, i t  is harder to 
get what he wants you to know."
"Staff members are less well prepared academically."
"I like  to be fam iliar with the professor."
"I rea lly  like  to know the teacher because I can 
then determine how they test and run the class."
"I don't like  independent study."
Medium High IP -
Must know the professor. 20
Rejection of a group of options. 14
Problems with "Staff" options. 10
Example statements:
"Because I don't like  independent study courses." 
"Professors are usually more interesting than s ta ff."
"I don't really  like  taking courses - independent 
study of lecture - by someone I don't know."
"Dislike when "Staff" is written in course catalog(sic)." 
" I f  I didn't know the professor I would be jumping 
into something."
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Medium Low IP -
Must know the professor 
Rejection of a group of options. 
Problems with "Staff" options.
18
16
9
Example statements:
"When they l is t  s ta ff they are usually trying 
to shove th e _______ of department on you."
"The difference between s ta ff and unknown is 
insignificant."
"I don't like to take classes from s ta ff."
"I prefer unknown professor because I know what to 
expect."
"The s ta ff could be someone I knew, but i t  could 
also be comeone I disliked."
Example statements:
"I like  to know who is teaching classes - -  especially 
independent study."
"Wary of s ta ff members especially in independent study."
"Staff members generally don't have a rounded out 
education enough to be knowledgeable on technical 
questions."
"Not knowing who the professor w ill be w ill make 
the nature of the class uncertain."
Low IP -
Must know instructor.
Wary of s ta ff classes.
Rejection of a group of options.
16
12
12
NEUTRAL REASONS
High IP -
No exp lic it reasons given. 
Can depend oh se lf.
Know what to expect.
16
5
4
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Example statements:
"Don't know.
"Gut feeling."
"When a ll the positive options run out, I ' l l  
resort to these."
"Independent study, you are usually on your own."
"I rea lly  have no particular interest in this s ta ff  
teaching in this school."
Medium High IP -
Not too risky, not too safe. 14
Know what to expect. 12
Can depend on se lf. 10
Example statements:
"These would be in the middle of the road because 
they are not too risky, but yet, not as certain as 
the ones below."
" I f  I know and like  the instructor, I w ill take any 
class from him."
" . . . I  would have a lo t of control over the 
material and get a lo t of feedback."
"Knowing the professor gives more of an idea of 
what to expect and how well you w ill do."
Medium Low IP -
Known professor. 15
Feedback in class. 13
Not risky or cautious. 10
Example statements:
"I know the professor and what he wants and expects." 
"I get more feedback from a discussion class and can 
express myself."
"Lecture classes are pretty neutral, no matter who 
teaches i t . "
"Pretty well structured, yet some uncertainty."
"The lecture-discussion with an unknown prof would be 
a llr ig h t - not great, but not bad."
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Low IP -
Unknown professor.
Lecture-discussion interesting. 
Don't like  lecture.
7
5
5
Example statements:
"Discussion makes i t  a b it better in that I get 
to know the person better."
"Lecture-discussion has always proved more 
interesting and helpful than just lecture."
"I dislike straight lecture."
"No real risk in independent study under s ta ff  
member but no challenge either."
"Impartial to s ta ff members, would rather take a 
course from a professor."
Example statements:
"I would know what he would like  and the speed I 
would hive to work a t."
"I feel more confident in nearly a ll cases with 
professors whom I know."
"In independent courses I feel I can be the instructor."
" I f  the teacher is known to you, you have an idea i f  
course is interesting or not and what is expected."
"You know what to expect from class and professor."
CAUTIOUS REASONS
High IP -
Know the professor. 
Know what to expect. 
Individual control
21
15
6
Medium High IP -
Known Professor.
Know what to expect. 
Individual control
19
15
5
THU
Example statements:
"I know who I am working with and they hopefully 
know you."
"I would know the professor and what he/she expects 
of me. - a comfortable situation."
"I like  discussions because can pick up more info 
to help on the tests."
"Independent study courses seem cautious because I 
would have a lo t of control over the material and get 
a lo t of feedback."
"Usually you can find out who is teaching a class 
that is listed as s ta ff from your Dept. Sec."
Medium Low IP -
Known Professor.
Know what to expect.
Individual control.
Example statements:
"I know a couple of real good teachers that I 
wouldn't mind taking any class from."
"I know the prof and what he wants and expects, and 
so I know how to react to him."
"Good situation know what to expect."
"I would feel fa ir ly  safe because I would have an 
agreement with the supervisor as to what exactly has 
to be done."
"How he grades, whether or not I can handle him."
Low IP -
Known professor.
Individual control.
Know what to expect.
Example statements:
"I like  to know who the professor is ."
"Know the personality of instructor, what they 
want and where they are coming from."
"While doing independent study the course is 
entirely in my hands and my grade is not affected 
by test scores or curves - just a paper saying 
everything I learned."
26
4
4
17
13
7
"You can personally relate and learn from a prof 
you know when doing independent study."
"There is a chance for feedback in class and the 
risk is in knowing the professor "
APPENDIX I
REASONS FOR THE CHOICES 
ON THE MORS
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The general content analysis categories w ill be shown followed
by a set of sample statements of the reasons given by the particular 
IP group.
High IP -
Individual control.
Perceived a b ility .
Individual reward.
Example statements:
"Because I feel I have the most control."
"I could do my part and have quite a b it  of control." 
"Each individual should be given the right to his 
own grade."
" I f  I do good i t  is because I deserve i t ,  i f  I do 
poorly I have no-one to blame but myself."
"I think in most classes I could do a suitable 
presentation."
"I can express myself orally  better than on paper."
13
12
10
Medium High IP -
13 
10 
10
Example statements:
"Because then you could control the grade you 
would get." (in a group of own choosing)
"I take mostly essay tests and I am geared to 
perform better on them."
"Where I am in doubt I can ask someone else who 
knows."
"I could make sure the group got the right answer."
Individual control.
Can get group help.
Can control the group's direction.
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Medium Low IP
Individual Control. 
Better learning.
Pooled knowledge better.
13
10
10
Example statements:
"2 heads are better than one i f  I can select the 
heads."
"I would rather do a test by myself."
"Can do own work with time to prepare."
"I feel i f  I should earn a grade, I should do the 
work."
"I could study and be to ta lly  prepared."
Example statements:
"Variety of backgrounds makes class presentation 
in random different people w ill work harder to get 
something meaningful together."
" It  would represent what I have gotten out of the 
class, my own ideas and feelings about the subject 
m atter."
" I f  I could choose my own group members to partake 
in an objective tes t, I would no doubt get an A. 
Believe me."
Low IP -
Pooled knowledge.
Individual control.
A better learning experience.
13
12
10
APPENDIX J
REASONS FOR THE CHOICES 
ON THE CRRS
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The general content analysis categories w ill be shown 
followed by a set of sample statements of the reasons given by 
the particular IP group.
High IP -
Example statements:
"Because i f  I know the professor, I know what is 
expected, I can discuss with him better."
"I'm more secure i f  I know the instructor."
"You know what is expected and how to deal with 
the instructor."
" I f  I know the professor I know better what he wants 
and what he w ill consider a good worker."
Example statements:
"You can also get involved in the class."
"F irs t, you can fin ish i t  up faster, also I 
always prefer to know the professor."
" I'd  be in control more than in other options."
"I feel you learn more when i t  is a lecture-
discussion especially by a teacher you know "
"Obviously i f  you know what to expect already from 
a professor and from previous experience know you 
can do well as you have the advantage of the professor 
already knowing you.
Know what to expect. 
Know the professor. 
Like discussion.
6
3
3
Medium High IP -
Professor's expectations are known. 
Control.
Better learning.
5
4
3
11.7
Medium Low IP -
Professor Is known.
Know what the professor expects. 
Better Leaning experience.
8
4
3
Example statements:
"You have good idea of what h e 'll want and how 
he tests, etc."
"I would get more out of an independent teaching 
situation."
"I like  independent study because I can do the 
work on my own time and what I learn or don't learn 
depends upon me."
"Under this option I w ill know what to expect 
from the class and the instructor. I t  helps me to 
plan my quarter's work,"
Example statements:
"I am taking an independent class right now and 
enjoy i t  immensely - I'm learning what I_ want to 
learn and not what the teacher wants me to learn."
"I learn more from independent study."
"I learn from some professor because they are 
predictable."
"Confident that I would get the most I can from the 
class and learn a lo t. This a ll assumes I like  the 
professor and his method of teaching."
Low IP -
Professor is known.
Learn more.
Less uncertain or more predictable.
4
3
4
